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In the SUpreme Court of the
State of Utah

MARCEIJLA JENSEN TUTrLE; and
RICHARD DALE TUTrLE, a minor,
by his Guardian ad litem, Marcella
Jensen Tuttle,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

NO. 7619

PACIFIC INTERMOUNTAIN EXPRESS COMPANY, a corporation,
and HEATH H. CORNETTE,
Defendants and ApJ)ellants.

RESPONDENTS' ANSWER TO REPLY BRIEF

As the purported "Reply Brief" of apellants contains
much argument that is repetitious, there will be some repetition in the answer to such brief..
We feel, too, that it should be observed that the appellants' original brief was served upon respondents on or
about the 2nd day of April, 1951, and consisted of 66 pages
of .printed material, and the brief was filed after an ex-
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2
tension of time granted by this Court. to apj;>ellants of substantially more time than a month beyond the usual time
based upon the stipulation of the parties.
Within twenty days thereafter respondents had to reply but a stipulation was secured extending the respondents' time to file their brief to the 20th day of May, 1951;
despite the stipulation, the time allowed to respondents to
file their brief was reduced to a few days prior to May 8th,
1951, and before such time had expired, the case was set
for oral argument on May 8th, 1951. Within the reduced
time, respondents filed their brief and the oase was argued
at the time indicated.
At the oral argument, counsel for the appellants indicated that they had not had an opport:unity to prepare
a Reply Brief and asked leave for a limited period, which
it is recalled in the absence of a record, to have been about
fifteen days, within which to file a Reply Brief.
Approximately one month later, to-wit on June 6th,
1951, respondents received a copy of an order from Hon.
George W. Latimer, Justice of this Court, extending appellants' time to file Reply Brief to June 22nd, 1951. This
order was made Without any communication or contact
with counsel for respondents and without their stipulation
or agreement. Since that time, there has been no contact
by rthe appellants or the Court with the respondents with
respect to any further extension, but, nevertheless, no Reply Brief was served upon respondents until August 8th,
1951, when the purported "Reply" of 44 pages of printed
matter was received, which is in no proper sense merely
a "Reply" but repeats largely many of the arguments in
appellants' principal brief of 66 pages, and also advances
in connection therewith, some new arguments and claimed
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authorities which are not properly included in any reply.
Thus, exactly three months after the case was orally
argued and permission granted for appellants to file a Reply Brief within fifteen days, and without any stipulation
or agreement made as far as respondents are concerned,
appellants filed a recapitulation and re-emphasis of
their argument contained in the original brief, together
with various new points advanced with a view of meeting
comments of members of the Court during the oral argument. Respondents have been given leave to file this response.
FACTS O·F CASE
The position of the appellants seems to be that if there
are claimed eye-witnesses to an occurrence, the jury should
be instructed to believe them as a matter of law no matter
how confusing, misleading, absurd, impossible and untenable their testimony might be. According to appellants,
their asserted eye-witnesses must be believed though it was
physically impossible ~or the occurrence to have happened
as they testified. They assert in substance that they must
be believed even though the physical facts· were such that
they could not see, as testified to by one (another disinterested witness) who was with the McPhies, the claimed eyewitnesses, whose testimony was so much relied upon by
counsel for appellants (Tr. 422). Counsel for appellants
assert that the Supreme Court should disregard the testimony which the jury knew was true, and believe the testimony of these claimed eye-witnesses, even though the
jury had the oportuinity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses called by the appellants, rand to consider the absurdity of their testimony and would not and could not believe them. That is the position of the appellants.
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Counsel reiterate that the McPhie testimony is corroborated by the testimony of Stevenson, Cornette and
even Mrs. Ellis. Cornette, as it may be recalled, was the
driver of the PIE truck involved in the collision. Stevenson admitted that he did not see the impact (Tr. 393). He
admitted that before driving up to the wires near the place
where the Tuttle car and the PIE vehicle had come to rest,
he stopped for an appreciable length of time and then drove
slowly up to the wires (Tr. 399-400). There were other
people he did not know who came from the east side of
the road before the pedestrians arrived and before he got
out or his car (Tr. 401-403).. These could have been no
others than Holt and Beardali. Mrs. Ellis saw them also
(Tr. 81). Cornette, the driver, had several different stories
as to how the thing happened. One has to but read his
testimony to see how the jury could not believe it. Upon
cross-examination, Mrs. Ellis stated that a car that could
have been none other than the Beardall car was on the
east side of the road where it had been driven as testified
to by Holt and Beardall, when the Stevenson car was
driven up to the wires (Tr. 81-82). After all, if the· Beardall car was where Mrs. Ellis saw it when the· Stevenson
car ·was driven up as was testified to by Holt, Beardall and
other witnesses, then Stevenson was wrong in his assumptions and the McPhies could not see as w.as testified to by
the witness, Elmer Roberts. Stevenson's negative teStimony that he didn't see the Beardall car there sould not
stand against· all the other testimony that it was here. The
fact is that because of the, physical facts, the clear and unequivocal testimony of the plaintiffs and all the surroundin circumstances, the jury was convinced of the fact that
Beardall drove his car just where he said he did and at
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the time he said he did. He drove it to the east side of the
road just after the impact and it was there where other
\\itnesses saw it, at the time the Stevenson car came up
to the wire. We do not feel that counsel should again and
again bring this matter before the Court, both in their
original brief and in their so-called Reply Brief. If the
jury believed the impossible testimony of their witnesses,
and if the physical :fjacts had corroborated their testimony,
the result would have, of course, been different. If the
Beardall car was on the east side of the road as believed
by the jury and as testified to by witness after witness,
if it \vas there as it was in fact, then, despite counsel's frantic and desperate attempts to have it somewhere else, then
Tuttle, just prior to the impact was driving north, as was
the fact, and the verdict of the jury should stand. That
should be sufficient. Lowder vs. Holley,
Utah._ _
233 P (2nd) 350. This should be sufficient, despite the
impossible, untenable, absurd testimony of the claimed eyewitnesses, who, it would appear, had spent most of the
night after the occurrence with the driver of the truck,
while Tuttle was fighting for his life, working out the details of an impossible story suggested by Stevenson when
talking to the truck driver when he tried to figure out in
his own mind what had happened to the Beardall car he
~ad been following. At the time the details of this impossible story were being worked out, Beardall and Holt, who
knew what had happened, were helping the family and
friends of Tuttle in his fight for life.
On ~the other hand, the testimony of the witnesses for
. plaintiffs was clear and convincing and in accord with the
physical mcts and human reason. General statements
made by counsel that the other side has engaged in state-
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ments and -conclusions calculated to confuse and distort
will not close the eyes of the Court to the facts as shown
by the record of the testimony in the case.
Counsel :fior the appellants even go so {!ar ·as to say
that the testimony of all witnesses who allegedly saw the
collision was undisputed. Such testimony was disputed
and proved impossible by respondents on every hand, and
for counsel to say it was undisputed is as absurd and as far
from the facts as is the testimony they seek to uphold.
Counsel for appellants spend a good deal of their brief
trying to upset the witness Holt's. testimony. Holt, it may
be recalled, was a friend of a friend of the Tuttles.
We will admit that Holt couldn't identify the Tuttle
car from its lights coming from the. south. The fact was
that after the truck had passed the Beardall car, he couldn't
observe the lights of the Tuttle car coming from the south,
as his vision was obstructed by the truck, which Holt said
was crossing over past the center and on the east and left
hand side of the road.
It is interesting to note in connection with Holt's
testimony that the Elliott boys who were standing somewhat north of Lou's attempting to get a ride to Springville
testified that the truck passed them about the same time
it was passing a car. They testified that there was at least
one car fullowing the car the truck was passin~ (Tr. 45,
47), and that there w~s no other car in front of the truck
going south (Tr. 50, 51). The truck didn't honk any more
·after it passed the Elliott boys (Tr. 51). There is little
question but that the Beardall car was the car the truck
was passing when it was passing the Elliott boys and that
the Stevenson car was following. This would have given
the northbound car seen by Holt time to reach the scene
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of the impact where it was struck by the PIE truck. There
is little question but that the pedestri~ans Stevenson observed after the truck passed him were the Elliott boys in
stead of the McPhies and Roberts as he had assumed. Beardan was in front of Stevenson and Tuttle was coming from
the south, and was struck on the east and left hand side of
the road.
We agree with the statement of ·counsel to the effect
that the witness' testimony on direct examination is no
stronger than as modified or limited by further examination or by cross-examination, but, of ·course, we must realize that the record of the testimony must in this case be
read in the light most favorable to the party for whom the
trier of facts has found, and we should take into consideration all of the testimony. Lowder vs. Holley, supra.
Looking at the testimony of the appellants, to the physical facts and to the cross-examination, it is easy to see why
such testimony did not stand up. This testimony wtas reviewed in respondents' original brief and should not be repeated. . On the other hand, there was nothing brought
out on cross-examination or otherwise at all inconsistent
with the theory of respondents.
Counsel object to the testimony of witness Charles M.
Roberts, Douglas A. Payne, Jean Elliott, Dellis and Gordon
Elliot that the PIE truck was going approximately 50 miles
per hour just prior to the impact. Oounsel says that their
testimony was only estimates as to speed. That may be so,
but of course we have the speed recorder that fixed the
speed of the truck at least 50 miles oo hour just prior to
the impact (Tr. 326), and Stevenson said that the truck
was going between 50 and 55 miles per hour at that time
(Tr. 408). Hbw can counsel object to rthis testimony?
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The testimony of these witnesses is fairly summarized on
pages 6 and 7 of respondents' original brief and the general
reference by counsel as to the negative chavacter of such
damaging testimony should not mi:slead anyone. Counsel
talk about friendly witnesses. Charles M. Rloberts, Douglas A. Payne, Jean Elliott, Gordon Elliott, Dellis Elliott,
Carol Ellis, Ernest L. Holt, and in fact all witnesses of the
plaintiff, except Beardall and Mr. and Mrs. Tuttle's family
were unacquainted with the deceased and his family prior
to the decedent's death. What is this talk about friendly
witnesses? Of course, they were friendly in that they testified as to what they saw and as to the facts, which fa~
were corroborated by physical evidence on every hand.
All through their brief, appellants snatch bits of testimony from the record, but even that does not appear
damaging at all to the respondents' theory and case. They
quote from the testimony of Douglas A. Payne and say
that he did not see the truck after 1 Y2 or 2 blocks after
it passed him but they did not refer to his testimony that
it went away in a whirl of snow, nor did they mention its
terrific speed to which he testified.
Of course, the Elliott boys would not remember all the
cars that passed them in a course of ten minutes, but they
did remember particularly the PIE truck because it was
far out of line. The fragments of testimony of the Elliott
boys snatched by counsel from the record should avail
them nothing. The testimony of Gordon that he turned his
back to the truck as it came on seemed to worry counsel.
They would have us believe that Gordon Elliott testified
that as the truck came from the north throwing up a lot
of wind and snow that he turned his face to the north.
The wind and snow would be coming from the north, and,
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of course, he turned to the south as he testified (Tr. 57,
66) and watched the truck as he testified, and as set out
in the Reply Brief of appellants on pages 10 and 11. The
testimony of the boys, however, was clear and unequivocal
that there was no other car south of the one that the truck
was passing when it was passing them; and the car which
the truck was passing at the time could be no other than
the Beardall car. Stevenson testified that the PIE driver
continued to honk the horn until after the truck passed
him. The Elliott boys testified that after the truck passed
the car almost directly opposite them the truck quit honking (Tr. 46). There is no question that the Stevenson car
was behind the Beardall car, and when the truck passed
the Beardall car it quit honking and began sliding across
the road because it went out of control and then struck the
Tuttle car on the east side of the road.
It is interesting to note that the appellants did not call
the Elliott boys at the first trial although their investigator
took a statement from Gordon shortly after the accident
(Tr. 70). The statement of Gordon Elliott quoted on pages
11 and 12 of the original brief of appellants is not inconsistent with the testimony and the theory of respondents.
This statement was written by the investigator for the appellants in his own handwriting, and as Gordon stated upon
his examination, did not contain other matters he told to
the investigator which would have been more damaging to
appellants' case. Even in that statement, the investigator
could not get Gordon to say that the collision involved a
southbound car. It is interesting to note further in the
.statement that the truck at about the time it went past
Gordon Elliott, was passing some other cars, not one car,
. but cars; and there is no question but what it passed both
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the Stevenson car and the Beardall car, and that the Beardan car, at the time it was passed, was further south than
the Stevenson car. The words put into the mouth of the
young boy by the investigator still would not avail the appellants.
There was nothing brought out on cross-examination
or in any other testimony of the witnesses, Holt, Beardall
and Ellis that established anything other than the fact that
the Beardall ear was the one that the truck passed after
it passed the Stevenson- car and that it was the one that
Stevenson mistakingly believed may have been the Tuttle

car.
Counsel argue that hearsay evidence is not competent
evidence, and object to the testimony of Mrs. Ellis as to
when she -changed her mind as to the direction the ·Tuttle
car was traveling. She testified that she had so changed
her mind when Stevenson told her thy had been mistaken.
This testimnoy merely established a point of time. She
could not account for the car which she saw on the east
when the Stevenson car first arrived at the scene (Tr. 82)
(Tr. 97). She was very frank in her first impression that
the Stevenson car had been following the Tuttle car, but
when she learned that they had been following the Beardall
car instead of the Tuttle ear, she could account for the car
being on the east side of the road which she observed when
she first arrived at the scene. This, among other reasons,
she testified, was why she changed her mind from her· first
mistaken impression which was seized upon by the driver
and the investigator (Tr. 97). Mrs Ellis also testified that
she told the investigator information such as the speed of
the truck, etc. which he left out of the statement which she
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gave him, testimony which would have been damaging to
the appellants' case.
Dispute as to the Beardall car.
Counsel for the appellants try to confuse the matter
as to whether the Bearoall or Stevenson ·car arrived first.
In order that the Court will not be misled by the parts of
the testimony of the witnesses, we quote in full the testimony of Beardall, the driver of the car, and Holt, his passenger, with respect to the wire:
Direct examination of Clifford Beardall:

"Naw will you state, Mr. Beardall, just what happened as the truck passed, if anything, or after the
truck passed?
A. Well, as the truck passed me it was only a

few seconds or some time until ·we heard a collision,
terrific impact and a light flash from the poles, and
Mr. Holt spoke to me and. said, 'Look at the light up
there.', and I said, 'Yes, look at the car across the
road.', and as I glanced at the car he said, 'Stop the
car. The wires are in front of you.', and as I pulled
my car to a stop the wires was aboUt eight inches
from my car.
Q. All right. Was there any ·car at all in front
of you?
A. I never seen a car in front of me, no sir.
Q. And what did you do then, Mr. Beardall?
A. I immediately opened my left hand door and
looked around to see if there was any traffic following
me, and turned my car in a diagoruil position across
the highway and on to the east side of the road and
pulled my lights up until they hit the scene of the accident.''
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Cross-examination of Cliffo;rd Beardall:
''Were the wires coming over the-laying up against
semitrailer of the truck?
A. No. I think the semi had gone past them.
Probably hit them at one time or another but gone by.
The pole on the west side was still up.
Q. . But the wires had come to rest, or were down
when you got there were they not?
A. Still moving, yes.
Q. Still moving which way, Mr. Beardall?
A. How would any wire knocked down be moving?
Q. If there was any current in the wires they
would be moving around I guess, wouldn't they?
A.
That's right.
Q. What I had reference to was the wires were
not falling at the time you got there?
A. No. No, they were at their destination, I
think.''
Direct examination Qf Ernest L. Holt:
"A.. Ordinarily when a truck passes you it stays
in the lane to the right of the center line,or gets into
the lane farthest to the right. In this case the truck
went over into the other inside lane of the northbound
traffic.
Q. And then just state what happened.
A. Well, the next thing we saw was a flash of
light caused by the utility pole being broken off, and
I saw this line fall across the highway and I called
Mr. Beardall's attention to hurry and stop the car before he hit it.
Q. And then what was done?
A. We stopped about a foot away from the line
and we immediately, Mr. Beardall I should say, im-
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mediately backed the car across the highway so that
the lights would. be directed on the car that was sitting
off to the side of the highway.
Q. All right. Now when you got up to the wires,
were there any other cars?
A. There were no other cars there.
Q. And then what did you do?
A. We had a railroad lantern in the back of the
car. I grabbed that and got out of the car and tried
to stop the cars that were coming so they wouldn't run
into the car.
Q. Then what happened?
A. Well someone, after we got the cars that were
coming to a stop, someone raised this wire to let the
cars go by, and someone else come along and took the
wire off the -pole and threw it to the other side of the
highway.''
No cross-examination of Ernest L. Holt with respect to this.
We must also remember the testimony of Mrs. Ellis
that there was a car at the scene to the east side when she
arrived in the Stevenson car, where it had been driven as
Holt and Beardall testified (Tr. 81-82) (Tr. 97). Stevenson also testified that before he drove up to the wire he
had stopped his car some distance to the north. and then
proceeded slowly up to the wire (Tr. 399). Payne also
t~fied that when he drove up to the scene he parked on
the east side behind a car that could have been no other
than the Beardall car (Tr. 37). Beardall stopped his car
within a few inches of the wires as they fell down (Tr. 137).
S~venson's car was not there then. Elmer ROberts, who
was one of the pedestrians with the McPhies came up to
the scene after the Stevenson ·car arrived and was parked
in ~ront of the wire. Roberts saw Beardall standing in the
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middle of the road as soon as he arrived (Tr. 423). There
is the inescapable conclusion that Beardall and Holt were at
the scene first. It is interesting to note that the street
lights on the east had gone out at the impact but there were
lights showin~ on the Tuttle car when Roberts arrived.
These lights eould have been from no other place but the
Beardall car. Roberts arrived at the scene before the
McPhies. The fact is that the Beardall car was the car
Stevenson mistakingly thought was the Tuttle car and that
is what the jury believed, and there is ample evidence to
support the findings of the jury. Beardall testified that
he heard the impact (Tr. 113).
Counsel for appellants further make the statement
tl.lat McPhies were allegedly standing right by the point
where the collision occurred. Of course, this is not the
fact, and even if the testimony of the McPhies is to be ~
lieved they were standing at a point approximately 600 feet
north of the point of impact. But even at that, according
to Roberts, who was with the McPhies, it was impossible
to see because of the snow being thrown up by the truck
(Tr. 422). The testimony of Carol Ellis does not corroborate that of the McPhies, as ·contended by counsel for
appellants.
On page 16 of their brief, counsel have had one of the
exhibits printed, being a photograph of the highway taken
sometime after the collision. It is in the brief apparently
to give a distorted picture of the width of the part of the
road covered by snow. An e~rt called by the respondents stated that the picture was distorted because it was
taken from the center of the road and would make the
snowy portion appear much wider than was the fact (Tr.
451.) Even in looking at the picture some distance down
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the road one can see that the darker portions and the center portions are more nearly the same width. The other
exhibits should be observed in order to show the true picture. We call particular attention to defendants' exhibit
12. We should remember here in determining whether or
not the PIE truck was over to the east or wrong side of
the road that the paved or hard surface of the highway
was 40 feet (Tr. 19-21) .. Each marked lane of traffic was
10 feet. Stevenson, one of appellants' witnesses, testified
that he drove his car down the darkened portion of the
road that can be seen on the right side of the photo which
appears on page 16 of appellants' brief. Stevenson testified that the center of the dark portion would be at about
the line dividing the two southbound lanes of traffic (Tr.
388). That was the portion upon which he was traveling.
That was also the testimony of officer Paul S. Anderson who
came to the scene of the occurrence (Tr. 165). This would
mean that the Stevenson car, in driving south, would be
approximately 2:Y2 feet on the inside lane of the southbound traffic. The truck, according to the driver's testimony, was 8 feet wide (Tr. 268). When the truck pas·sed
Stevenson, there could only be 7:Y2 feet available for the
truck on the southbound portion of the road if there were
no distance at all between the truck and the Stevenson car
when the truck passed. Standing side by side with the
Stevenson ·car without any space between, the truck would
have been over beyond the center of the highway at least
one-half foot. He would have had to have some room to
pass, as according to Mrs. Ellis the trailer swerved all
around them when it passed them (Tr. 86). They gave it
plenty of room (Tr. 86). Stevenson's. car traveled in same
lane (Tr. 80, Tr. 275 and Tr. 388), according to Mrs. Ellis,
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Cornette, the driver, and Stevenson, and so it is inescapable
that at all times in the vicinity of the -collision the truck
was over the center of the highway as much as several
feet. Beardall ·testified that he was driving in the dark
portion of the highway, and Cornette testified that both
the Stevenson car and the car he thought was the Tuttle
car was driving in the dark portion of the highway (Tr.
275) . Holt testified that while they were driving in the
dark portion of the highway and at the time the truck
passed them it went way on the east side of the highway,
and Gordon Elliott testified that when the truck went
around a turn of the road it cut across the turn more to
the east side of the highway. The speculation of the McPhies and others that the truck was on the west and correct side of the highway falls upon the testimony of Stevenson, Officer Anderson, and other witnesses, and even
upon the testimony of the driver Cornette, which testimony again shows it was physically impossible because
of the width of the truck to hq.ve had its east wheels west
of the center part of the highway, and in fact, according
to Holt, it was way over to the east or wrong side of the
highway· at the time of the impact (Tr. 137).
Physical Facts
On page 20 of their Reply Brief, counsel for appel-

lants have inserted copies of the photos, defendants' exhibits 3, 4 and 9. On page 7 of their original brief, they
have shown the plat of the scene of the impa-ct, plaintiffs'
exhibit "GG". On the plat of the scene of the impact the
driver Cornette has drawn on the west part of the fourlane highway his version of the occurrence. The truck is
marked with a figure "2" and the ~car he claimed was the
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Tuttle. car is marked with a "1". It may be noted that in
his diagram he claimed the Tuttle car at the time of the
impact was facing to the southeast and that the truck
first struck the car from the left side of the rear at the
time the Tuttle car allegedly turned in front of the truck.
The driver testified that the right hand side of the bumper
of his truck first struck the car "Kind of diagonal" (Tr.
263). If this were so, the force would be from the rear
to the front of the Tuttle car. However, if we look at the
defendants' exhibits which appear on page 20 of appellants'
Reply Brief and particularly. at the first two that appear
on ~e top of. the page, we may note that the force was
from the front to the back of the Plymouth automobile.
This \Vould be entirely in conformance with the theory of
the respondents that Tuttle was traveling north and turned
to the right to avoid the PIE truck which went out of control over to the east side of the road.
Counsel on page 21 of their Reply Brief try to explain
how the Plymouth· automobile could end up east and quite
a distance north of the point the PIE truck came to rest
on the east side of the highway. We must remember that
the PIE outfit, weighing between sixty and sixty-four
thousand pounds, was going south at a rate of almost fiftytwo miles per hour. If the Plymouth auto, weighing under two tons, turned in front of the PIE truck as appellants assert, it would have been thrown way down the highway in front of the PIE truck, and would have been way
to the south. If it had happened as Cornette represents
on his diagram appearing on page 7 of the original brief of
appellants, it would have been thrown way to the west and
south of appellants' truck. Counsel assert that the momentum from the truck would have ·carried it further than
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the Plymouth auto. We must not forget, however, that
the momentum of the truck struck the Plymouth auto as
the auto showed evidence of the tremendous impact. It
is unthinkable that if the car turned at an angle in front
of the truck as testified to by the McPhies, going little
more than five miles per hour, that it could have made the
big truck, going more than fifty miles per hour, and weighing more than thirty times the weight of the Plymouth,
turn to the east, and then have the car end up further to
the north and east than such PIE truck (Tr. 263, 368).
The theory is incredible. No wonder the jury could not
believe it.
On the other hand, the physi-cal facts show that the
PIE truck· was over on the east side of the highway, cutting across the curve, flashing its lights on and off and
Tuttle, approaching from the_ south, turned to the right
to avoid the impact and was struck somewhat from the
front as the photos show on page 20 of appellants' brief.
The truck jacknifed and the momentum of the car carried it north and east of the truck. There is no question
but that those are the simple, inescapable facts.
Counsel, as did Cornette in his diagram on page 7 of
apellants' original brief, assumed that the first point of impact with the Plymouth was toward the rear of such car,
the force then would have been from re·ar to front, but
the photos on page 20 of appellants' Reply Brief show and
demonstrate that the force was from front to back, and
as may be seen from their own exhibits their theory will
not hold water.
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Time of Accident

Many witnesses for the respondents set the time of
the departure of Dal~ Tuttle from Springville (Tr. 145,
154, 177, 183, 189). That was the testimony believed by
the jury, the arguments of counsel for appellants were all
advanced in their argument before the jury. The testimony of all the witnesses as to the time of the departure
of Dale Tuttle, their opportunity to observe and reasons
for observation was all clear and convincing. It would certainly appear unnecessary to reiterate and go over this
testimony, time and time again. The fact is that appellants could not and cannot now explain the time element.
Respondents' Authorities
The objection that counsel have to the authorities is
mainly premised upon their belief that the jury had to believe their purported eye-witnesses which they did not and
could not believe because of the impossibility of their testimony. If they believed that they were not telling the
truth, which is the inescapable conclusion, then there
were no eye-witnesses to the occurrence. We agree in the
main to the general principles stated by the appellants that
the cases should be decided upon the facts, and that the
cases should not be decided upon mere speculation. We
do not believe that testimony of alleged eye-witnesses
whose testimony is impossible and contrary to the physical facts is entitled to any credence. It is in fact no testimony at all. Counsel argue that the holding in the case
of Perrin v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 59 Utah 1, 201 P. 405
militates against respondents' position. In that case there
was a question of the contributory negligence. of decedent
and it was there stated that in the absence· of evidence
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there was a presumption that decedent was using due care.
In the instant case, the jury did not believe the testimony
of the witnesses for appellant, they did not believe that the
decedent was traveling south at the time of the impact.
There was no evidence as to his conduct in driving north
toward Provo, and the Court's Instruction No. 6 that "In
the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that the deceased used due car for his own pro-tection," was properly before the jury. Ryan v. Union
Pac. R. R. Co.; 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71. Duhren et al v.
Stewart, 39 c·A 2nd 201, 102 P. 2nd 784.
The cases referred to by respondents on pages 15 and
16 of their original brief support their theory. The physical facts do not corroborate any testimony of the appellants but on the contrary entirely corroborate the evidence
of respondents. Respondents' evidence is direct and positive, and contrary to appellants' contention is not negative. The facts which the respondents' evidence show,
could result in no verdict other than the verdict as given
by the jury.
Defendants' motion for a directed verdict was properly
denied.
We cannot see the necessity of rehashing the Court's
action in denying defendants' motion for a directed verdict. Appellants' and defendants' contentions were treated
in detail in respondents' brief pages 12 to 20 inclusive. Appellants inje-ct nothing new in support of their contention
in their so-called "Reply Brief." Their assertions are fully
answered in respondents' original brief. They still reiterate that the jury was by law required to believe the t~ti
mony of their so-called eye-witnesses, whose testimony was
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strictly at variance with physical possibility, and was absurd, far-fetched and contrary to the facts. That is their
main contention to support their motion for a directed verdict. The positive, clear and convincing testimony of respondents in accordance with the physical facts and human reason was believed by the jury. There could have
been no other decision.
Appellants' reference to instructions.
There is no question but that the Court submitted to the
jury in fair and impartial language the controlling question as to the direction of travel of decedent, just prior to his
death. There is no question but that the jury decided that
the decedent was traveling north. Appellants' objections
to the instructions were also treated fully on pages 20 to
32 of respondents' original brief. Appellants' so..called reply is merely a reh~h and reiteration. There is nothing
new in their arguments in this connection.
Determination by jury of direction of travel.
The argument of counsel that the jury did not determine that the Tuttle car was traveling north is brought to
an interesting light in referring to appellants' Exceptions
to the Instructions of the Court. We call the Court's attention to the language of counsel in their exception to
instruction No. 5 of the Court (Tr. 462):
"Excepts to the Court's Instruction No. 5 and
to the whole thereof, for the reason that the Instruction is not justified under the evidence in that it makes
the sole issue in the case whether the deceased's car
was going northbound or southbound, and eliminates
the question of contributory negligence if deceased was
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going northbound. Also, that there is probative evidence that deceased was northbound."
Again in their brief the counsel for appellants gather
portions of instructions in a hope of getting a misleading
interpretation. Both in their opening statement to the
jury and in their argument to the jury, eounsel for the appellants stated that the sole question was the direction of
travel of the deceased. Counsel for respondents concurred
in that statement. The instructions of the c·ourt made this
issue clear and correctly stated the law. In an effort to
confuse, the appellants quote part of the material instructions, and although the instructions 3 and 4 were quoted
in respondents' original brief on pages 25 and 26, we again
quote them in full with instruction No. 5 to again emphasize to the Court the clear picture and questions given by
the instructions and to show how unfair counsel for appellants are attempting to be. The instructions follow:
"No. 3. You are instrueted that plaintiff's contention is that at the time of the accident, the deceased,
Dale Tuttle, was driving an automobile north on the
highway at the time and place of the accident, and
that the defendant, Heath H. Cornette, was driving
defendants' truck south upon said highway in the opposite direction, and that plaintiffs further claim that
the defendant Cornette carelessly and negligently
turned and drove defendants' truck across the center
line, and thereby proximately causing the collision.
''If you find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendants were negligent as elaimed by the
plaintiffs, the accident having occurred as claimed by
the plaintiffs and that such negligence of the defendants, if any, was the proximate cause of the death of
Dale Tuttle, and if you further find from the evidence
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that the said Dale Tuttle exercised reasonable care for
his own safety and was not himself guilty of negli- ·
gence contributing to his death, then you are instructed that it will be your duty to return a verdit in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in this
action for damages to be fixed and ·assessed by you
in aet.--ordance with instructions as herein given.
"No. 4. You are instructed that the defendants
claim in their pleadings herein that at the time of the
accident that both cars or vehicles involved in this
accident were traveling south, the Tuttle car being in
the west lane or shoulder, and defendants' truck be...
ing in the lane next west to the center line, and that
just as defendants' truck was going to overtake and
pass the car driven by Mr. Tuttle, Mr. Tuttle suddenly made a left turn in front of the defendants' truck,
causing the collision.
"You are further instructed that if you find from
the evidence that both drivers were in fact traveling
south and that the deceased, Dale Tuttle, was negligent
in suddenly turn~g in front of defenda~ts' t~ck apd
that such negligence proximately contributed to cause
the collision, then plaintiffs cannot recover and your
verdict must be in favor of the defendants against the
plaintiffs, no cause of action.
"No. 5. The fact that I have instructed you on
the law applied to the conflicting contentions of the
parties should not be taken by you as an indication
the court believes that the ~efendant was going either
southbound or northbound, but are given to enable
yo~ to decide the case under the law, according tn
whether you feel the deceased was southbound or
northbound." (Emphasis ours.. )
How can counsel be serious? The jury. had to determine the direction of travel of decedent in order· to decide,
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and there is no question but that they determined that he
was going north. There was no question in· counsel's minds
at the time their exceptions were taken after the submission
of the case to the jury that the instructions of the Court
were such that the case should be decided upon the question as they had stated in their opening statement and argument before the jury, that if the deceased, prior to the
impact, was going north there should be recovery, and if
going south there should be no recovery. Appellants at.tempt now to confuse the whole matter by quoting portions of instructions which do not give the true picture.
Defendants' theory of the evidence submitted to jury.

Again counsel wants to rehash the issues. There is
no question but what appellants' theory was clearly submitted to the jury and upon their opening statement, their
theory was that the decedent was traveling south just be·fore the impact~ The defendants' requests which the appellantS argue should have been given were merely repetitious. and, in most cases, were biased and argumentative
reiter~~ions of the single theory of the defendants, that the
deceased was going south.· The ultimate question of direction of travel of the deceased was properly submitted to
the jury. . In examining defendants' requests for instructions and particularly Nos. 5, 8, 9, 10, and 11 referred to
on page 31 ·of their Reply Brief, we fail to find anything
that should have been submitted to the jury under proper
instructions, that was not submitted. :Counsel makes the
·broad, general statement that because of· the failure of
the Court to give their requests, there was prejudicial error, even- though the material substance of their requests
. was given,. without repetition as was desired by the appel-
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lants. The issues of direction of travel of deceased, and
of contributory negligence were placed squarely before the
jury in instructions No. 3 (J.R. 223) and No. 4 (J.R. 224)
and No. 5 (J.R. 225), and we feel that it would have been
error for the Court to give repetitious emphasis to the defendants' theory as requested. An instruction on their
theory was requested in appellants' request No.4 (J.R. 201).
and their theory was presented to the jury by the Court.
There were no "errors or procedure" calculated to do harm,
as claimed by appellants.
ill course, as appellants assume, there was no acknowledgment of errors in this case in the Court's instructions. The respondents' only acknowledgment rests in
their statement, that even if we assume the appellants

were correct in their contention that there was error, then
there should be no ground for reversal because such errors
as the appellants assumed were committed were not prejudicial. Counsel for appellants again refer to the case of
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Company, 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349.
They refer in their brief to the statement made in such
case that where there are errors calculated to do harm,
they would be presumed to be prejudicial unless it is shown
that they are not. The Jensen case was referred to in respondents' brief, 31 and 32.
In the instant case, we have demonstrated time after
time that any error, claimed or assumed, by the appellants
was not only not calculated to do harm, but could not have
been in any way prejudicial. Whichever view the jury
took on direction, determined the outcome. In fact ap]>ellants do not even contend that if the deceased just prior
to the impact was traveling north, that they would not be
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liable. The case of Thelin v. Stewart; 100 Cal. 312, 34 P.
701, cited by .appellants further supports the respondents'
view in this connection. From that case, the following is
quoted from page 704:
"We think this but an admonition that errors, or
defects, shall not be presurhed prejudicial, to have
sulted in miscarriage of justice and thus that harmful
results are not to be presumed from, nor reversals
granted, for mere error. In the language of the statute, the court, before it is warranted in reversing a
judgment, 'must be satisfied' that a committed error
resulted in prejudice of some substantial right. But
how satisfied? Not by a presumption from mere error, but by something showing such prejudicial effect.
How may that be shown? Some committed errors,
prima facie, are not calculated to do harm. Hence no
presumption of harmful effect is to be indulged.
Nevertheless, the party against whom such errors are
made may, by the record, demonstrate, if he can, that
the rulings did resul.t to his prejudice of some substantial right. On the other hand, error may be committed which, prima facie, is calculated to do harm
and to affect substantial rights. From such error
prejudice and harmful effect of such rights will be presumed until, by the record, it is demonstrated that the
error did not have, or could not have had, such prejudicial or harmful effect; and, if not so demonstrated,
then, ought the court to be satisfied that prejudice resulted."

re-

In the instant case, we submit that there was not even
error calculated to do hann, but have gone further than
our burden should be and have demonstrated from the record that there ·could have, in fact, been no prejudice. The
jury decided the ultimate fact in favor of the respondents
and the appellants should not now be allowed to complain
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because they were instrumental i:n submitting such ij}timate fact to the jury in their requests, in their argwnent·
to the jury, and in their opening statement, the ultimate
fact of direction of travel of deceased.
The case of Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co!',
73 Utah 486, 275 P. 582, treats mainly with the presumption of due care in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
and the holding in that case would support the Court's
instruction that in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
there would be a presumption that the deceased used due
care. Nothing in that case would support the appellants'
contention of any precedure or error calculated to do hann.
The other authorities cited add nothing more to their contention.
There was no "procedure" in this case calculated to prejudice, as claimed by appellants in their Reply Brief.

We hesitate to repeat in any way the substance of our
original brief, but in view of the fact that the appellan~'
so-called Reply Brief appears to ·be merely a repetition of
their original brief, some repetition on our part is inevitable.. Appellants again refer to the Court's instruction
No. 1. The instruction as we have stated merely recited
the various allegations of the parties and clearly stated
that such allegations were denied by the opposing parties.
There were no allegations recited concerning the conduct
of the defendants upon which there was not ample evi:dence. The instruction also recited the elaims of the defendants as to the conduct of the deceased, some claims
upon which there was not any evidence introduced. There
could be and was no argument but what speed was a con. tributing factor in the death of the deceased, as there was
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a·mple evidence that the PIE truck went out of control before any impact (Tr. 389-390). If the jury had believed
that the deceased was traveling south prior to the impact,
then speed may not have contributed to the death of de.
ceased, because if that had been so, under the instructions
to the jury, plaintiffs could not recover; but the jury did
.not believe the contentions of the defendants, and could
well have found upon the evidence ·and ~nstructions that
speed was a major contributing factor .
. There was no error "calculated to prejudice," as

cia~.

All of the cases cited by appellants in objection to the
Court's instruction No. 15 concerned 'situations where the
giving of such instruction would be prejudicial. None of
such cases are from this jurisdiction except Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176, where such an instruction
was not considered as prejudicial error, as the case was
reversed on other grounds.
Where, as in this case, the appellants have emphasized
that the control~ing question was the direction of deceased's
travel, whether north or south, and that question has been
submitted to the jury; then assuming, as we ·do not, that
the Court's instruction as to speed was erroneous, it would
not be prejudicial because if the jury had decided that. the
deceased was not traveling north at the impact, there could
have been no verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs. The
jury was instructed in effect that if the decedent was traveling south and turned in front of the defendants' truck
as alleged by the defendants there could be no recove~.
We have demonstrated throughout our arguments and
·brief time after tim-e that instruction No. 15, assuming
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that the defendants are correct in their assertions, could
not have been prejudicial.
Counsel again reierates their objection to the Court's
instruction No. 14, and we say again that in instruction
No. 14, no greater burden was placed upon the defendants
than was proper. The Court's instruction is quoted as follows:
"You are instructed that in addition to the duty
to keep a proper lookout, a driver must at all times
maintain such control over his automobile and must
take such measures as are reasonable to stop or turn
to avoid a collision with another vehicle or person upon
the highway reasonably within range of his vision.
And in the event such driver fails or neglects to so
keep his vehicle under control as set forth above, he
is negligent. And where such negligence proximately
causes injury or damage to any other person or property, the driver of such vehicle is liable for all resulting damage, unless such person is himself guilty of
negligence which proximately contributes to produce
the injury.. ''
The cases Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 261, 170 P. 72;

State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177; treat with conflicting instructions and it could not be determined whether
the jury was following the correct or incoiTect instruction
in reaching their verdict. That is very much different
than here where the material matter they were to determine was the direction of travel of deceased. The ·case of
Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127, held that
where the Court failed to advise the jury as to the effect
of alleged negligence on the part of plaintiff, should it find
that such negligence proximately contributed to her own
injuries, it was prejudicial error.
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No error in Court's instruction No. 13.
Again the appellants quote a part of an instruction in
order to give an unfair and biased picture. It may be noted
that the Court instructs the jury that it is the duty of a
driver of a motor vehicle upon the public highways in the
state to at all times exercise due care and diligence in order to prevent injury to persons or property lawfully upon
the highway. In order to give a clear picture of the instruction, we quote it:
"You are instructed that it is the duty of a driver
of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this
State to at all times exercise due care and diligence
in order to prevent injury to persons or property lawfully upon the highway. Included in this duty to use
due care and diligence is the duty to constantly keep a
lookout not only ahead, but to the sides of his vehicle,
and to actually see, as well as look for, all persons, objects and things which are reasonably within the range
of his vision, arid which may constitute a hazard. It
is then his further duty after having seen, or after he
should have seen, to use such care and diligence as a
reasonable and prudent person, having due regard to
all conditions of the highway, the presence of intersections, obstructions or any other condition which
may produce a hazard, would use to prevent injury.
And in the event that a driver fails or neglects at any
time to exercise such reasonable care and diligence,
he is negligent. And if, as a proximate result of such
negligence, injury or damage is caused to any person,
the driver so causing the injury or damage is liable
to the person thus injured for all damages sustained
by reason of such negligence, unless such person is
himself negligent and his negligence proximately contributes to produce the injury.
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''Thus, if you find from a preponderance of the
evidence in this case that the defendant, while operating his truck-trailer, failed to use the degree of care
and caution as set forth above, and that as a direct and
proximate result thereof Dale Tuttle was killed, your
verdict should be in favor of the plaintiffs, unless you
also fmd that the deceased, Dale Tuttle, was also n~g
ligent in some respect and such negligence proximately
contributed to produce the accident with its consequent death of deceased."
In looking at the instruction as a whole, it may be

observed that the Court did not impose an absolute duty
and it is not a fact that it imposed liability upon the defendants if the driver did not "constantly keep a lookout
not only ahead but to the sides of his vehicle", as in considering the instruction as a whole, there could be no prejudice to the defendants, for if the jury found that the deceased was going south, it was instructed in find in effect
.. for the defendants, and if he were going north, the instruction was wholly immaterial as the truck would be on the
wrong side of the road. Even in the case of Morrison v.
Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772, cited by appellants in
their original and reply briefs, the Court holds that under
some circumstances there would be required a constant
lookout. The Court as stated in our original brief, in view
of the dangerous conditions of the road, as brought out
by the evidence, could well instruct as a matter of law

that there was required a constant lookout in the ins~t
case, but the Court qualified his instruction more ~ favor
of the appellants.
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Submitting all allegations.
For the reasons stated on pages 21, 22, and 28 of respondents 'original brief, there was no error in submitting
all allegations. A;ppellants add nothing to . their original
arguments in their Reply Brief, excepting that they allude
to the number of requests of respondents apparently in
connection with the Supreme Court's ·comments in the oral
argument. The fact is that there was substantial evidence
in the record to show negligence on the part of the defendants in every way alleged in the complaint, and that such
negligence· contributed to the death of the deceased, and
was the proximate cause thereof.

Refenences as to speed, etc.
The main objection apparently made by appellants
seems to be that there were too many requests which referred to the speed of truck and other matters, whether
or not the requests were given by the Court. They do not
contend that speed was not a contributing factor and that
it was not proved at the trial of the case.

Re.:£erenoo to lights.
True it may be that reference to the lights of the truck
in the instructionss would not he proper if the jury believed
the fiction that prior to the death of the deceased he was
~raveling south. On the other hand it was proper to submit the matter to the jury because lights flashing on and
off bright beam could well confuse and blind oncoming traffic. Further reference to this seems unnecessary as it has
been covered in both the appellants' brief and the re·spondents' brief.
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Referenc~

as to presumption.

Again we say in answer to appellants' reassertion, that
there was no error in the Court's Instruction No. 6, and
the Court, 1n accordance with the rule stated in the case
of Clark v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. Co., 73 Utah 486,
275 P. 582, correctly instructed the jury that in the absence of evidence to the contrary there would be a pre-sumption that the deceased exercised due care for his own
safety. The jury believed under the instructions of the
Court that the deceased was proceeding north jus.t prior
to the impact, and there was no evidence as to any contributory negligence on his part at all. The theory was
presented to the Court in plaintiff's requests Nos. 12 (J.R.
161) and 13 (J.R. 162).
Appellants' requested instruction No. 19 (J.R. 216)
assumed that the jury must believe the alleged eye-witnesses against all reason and physical evidence and that the
Court should so instruct the jury. Their request was made
only upon their theory of the case based upon the fiction
that the deceased was traveling south. It would ·have ben
improper and error to give such request as an instruction
and the Court properly declined to give it. The· instruction of the Court was correct. Ryan v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71. See also Duehren et al v. Stewart, 39 C. A. 2d, 102 P.2d 784.
There was no over-emphasis as to. inferences and presumptions.
Counsel's general statements as to the Court's instruction No. 9 should avail nothing. Counsel fails to and cannot point how such instruction is erroneous. The Court's
instruction No. 9, we submit, was correct.
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Sud<len emergency.
Instruction No. 22 (J.R. 2443) had as much application to the ·case on defendants' theory as well as plaintiffs'
theory. If the defendants' theory had been believed by
the jury, they might have thought that the driver of the
PIE truck could have done something to avoid the accident, but under the instruction of the Court would not
have held the defendants responsible because the driver
failed to choose the wiser of two courses. Respondents'
requests were not in any way in the abstract, but related
to the actions of Tuttle. Appellants requested an instruction based upon their theory that if the deceased were
traveling south and turned in front of the defendants'
truck that there should be no recovery, whether or not
there was an emergency -created thereby even though the
truck driver could have reasonably anticipated the actions
of the driver in front and could have avoided the impact
(defendants' requests No. 8, J.R. 205; No. 9, J.R. 206; No.
10, J.R. 207). Their theory was correctly submitted to
the jury by the ·Court, and their requests would have been
improper if adopted as requested. Of course, since the
jury believed that the decedent, Dale Tuttle, just prior to
the collision was traveling north, instruction No. 22 would
apply to his actions.
Re insurance indemnification.
The matter of insurance was first brought out by appellants on cross-examination (Tr. 90) . It could not in
any way be prejudicial. The matter, we feel, was fully
covered in respondents' original brief, pages 32 to 38. Appellants' statements herein are mere reiteration. The jury
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would know that the PIE could certainly answer in damages as well as an insurance company.
CONCLUSION
All that respondents ask is that the Court examine
the evidence as we are sure they will. We ask that they
look at the testimony \Vhich for some reason or other the
appellants refer to as negative. Perhaps they mean that
it negates their fictitious and impossible testimony. Be

that as it may, the occurrence ,could only have happened
if the deceased were going north as there is ample evidence
to show. Again we point out the fact that the only supposed argument the appellants have is that the jury should
have been instructed to believe the testimony of their witnesses, no matter how impossible and absurd such testimony might have been, no matter how -contrary to the
physical facts. There is ample evidence to support the verdict of the jury, and their verdict should be upheld.
We have in no way sought to rely upon sympathy,
nor did we at any time during the trial. The appellants
were the ones who talked about sympathy in an effort to
obtain special consideration from the jury by these tactics. We at no time sought to capitalize on the fact that
the PIE is a large corporation. Appellants were the
only ones who have emphasized this fact in an effort to
get the jury, and now this Court, to sit up so straight that
they lean over backwards; yet it should not be held against
the defendants that they are a widow and a minor child,
nor should it be taken as a matter justifying special consideration to the defendant company that it is a large
corporation, well able to respond to any judgment that is
justified by the facts and the law.
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It would seem against the interests of justice to set
aside the verdict of the jury so fairly reached, and the fact
that the jury would not believe the defendants' witnesses
because of their impossible and improbable testimony
would seem no reason to so set aside the verdict of the
jury. The fact that one of the members of this honorable
Court commented during the oral arguments with respect
to the large nwnber of requests for instructions, and because of the fact that the appellants in their purported
"Reply" Brief have repeatedly adverted to such matter,
should certainly be no good reason for a reversal of the
case, nor the proper subject for a Reply Brief. We feel
confident that the Court will look beyond the general allegations of the appellants to the facts and law of the case
as brought out by the record, and sustain what without
question is a fair, well ·considered, and impartial verdict of
the jury.
Respectfully submitted,

A. H. CHRISTENSON
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
PIITLLIP V. CHRISTENSON
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